

Lieutenant General Gary H. Hughey, USMC

Deputy Commander

United States Transportation Command

(September 2002 to November 2004)

AN ORAL HISTORY

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November 2006

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

Preface

Lieutenant General Gary Hughey had the distinction of being the first Marine Corps general officer assigned to United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) as the USTRANSCOM Deputy Commander.

General Hughey served at a momentous time. During his tenure, the command not only planned and executed the deployment and sustainment of forces for the war with Iraq and follow-on operations (Operation Iraqi Freedom); it also received a new mission as deployment process owner, which transformed the command from being just the single manager for defense transportation into the single entity charged with directing the execution of strategic distribution for the Department of Defense. General Hughey discusses these and other topics from his perspective as a key member of the USTRANSCOM leadership.

Prior to General Hughey's retirement in January 2005, I conducted three hour-long interviews with him on 26 October, 2 November, and 9 November 2004. This oral history has been crafted from the transcripts of those interviews. The original recordings and verbatim transcripts are available in the USTRANSCOM Research Center.

Margaret J. Nigra, historian at USTRANSCOM, transcribed the tapes, edited the manuscript, created and arranged the front and back matter, generated the index, designed the cover, and prepared the final copy for publication. While gratefully acknowledging her invaluable and indispensable contributions, I retain sole responsibility for any errors or shortcomings.

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Introduction

First Marine Corps General at USTRANSCOM

Dr. Smith: You are the first Marine Corps flag officer and first Marine Corps deputy commander at USTRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command]. How did that come about?

Gen Hughey: That was interesting. I was in Korea minding my own business on an exercise in 2001. I was talking with Jerry Humble [Marine Corps Major General Jerry D., Commander, US Marine Corps Forces Korea and Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy, and Strategy, United Nations Command and Republic of Korea/US Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea, 1998 to 2001], and he indicated to me that I was being nominated for a deputy CINC [commander in chief] job. I had heard nothing about it, so when I got back to Japan where I was the Deputy Commander, US Forces Japan, I called Headquarters Marine Corps and asked "What's going on?" And they said, "The Marine Corps is going to nominate a flag officer to serve as the deputy combatant commander at USTRANSCOM, and it's a logistics assignment." Lieutenant General [Gary S.] McKissock, who was our deputy commandant for installations and logistics [(I&L), September 1999 to September 2002], had indicated that he wanted me nominated for that position. That was a good thing for me, and I think a good choice on the part of General McKissock.

There were two of us who were logisticians at the two-star rank at that time, and both of us were probably vying for the deputy commandant for I&L position. The odds on favorite was Rick Kelly [Marine Corps Major General Richard L., I&L, September 2002 to September 2005], and that was rightfully so, because he had spent a lot of time at Headquarters Marine Corps, knew what they were doing, and knew where the Marine

Corps was going in logistics. On the other hand, I had been in joint assignments or in Okinawa, out there on the edge of the empire, and had not been involved in the efforts within the Marine Corps to improve our logistics processes. Rick Kelly was more informed on that, and he really was the right choice. Quite frankly, they were looking for a job for me.

The TRANSCOM job didn't pan out because General Brown [Army Lieutenant General Daniel G., Deputy Commander, USTRANSCOM, October 1999 to September 2002] did not retire that year. He stayed another year. So I remained at US Forces Japan for my second year, which I should have been doing. It was also a very good decision because of what we were working on at the time, and what we managed to get accomplished in the second year I was out there.

Our Commandant, General Jones [Marine Corps General James L., Commandant of the Marine Corps, July 1999 to January 2003], had a rather novel idea in the assignment of general officers, and that was to ask us what we would like to do. [Laughter] We corresponded with him individually at the beginning of each year. I indicated that since the intent had been to nominate me the year before for the TRANSCOM position, they do the same in 2002, since that year it would be vacated. And he did that. In February of 2002 I came to TRANSCOM to interview for the job, and the rest is history.

Dr. Smith: In what ways do you think your career prepared you for this?

Gen Hughey: The Marine Corps doesn't have a component in TRANSCOM. Our transportation within the Marine Corps is all at the tactical level. We do trucks, and that's about it. But we're a big customer of TRANSCOM's. I think that, more than anything else, prepared me for the TRANSCOM deputy job, because I was looking at everything from a customer's perspective. I know what it's like to stand out there on the tarmac in the rain waiting for a C-5A that doesn't show up. I know what it's like to

wonder where my shipment is, to know that it's supposed to be coming but have no clue as to when it's going to arrive. I've been a logistician in the Marine Corps my entire career, so that logistics background and that customer perspective were the main skills that I brought to the position, the best experience for the *traditional* TRANSCOM role.

But General Handy [Air Force General John W., Commander, USTRANSCOM, November 2001 to September 2005] was changing the traditional role of TRANSCOM. He was looking at the command as a supply chain manager, a distribution process owner. TRANSCOM was stepping into a new realm. And because my background was supply chain management, I think that was another reason that I was a good fit. I think that had a lot to do with why he selected me.

Dr. Smith: What does it mean to the Marine Corps and to TRANSCOM that you're the first Marine Corps flag officer, first Marine Corps deputy commander?

Gen Hughey: It says a lot about the Marine Corps logistics community more than anything else. The Corps is a relatively small Service compared to the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. When I came into the Marine Corps I don't know that we had any two-star logisticians. I was fortunate to be at Headquarters Marine Corps when we made the first three-star. This is the first time in our history that we've had two three-star logisticians serving on active duty at the same time in the Marine Corps. It's a recognition that the logistics community within the Marine Corps has grown in stature and a recognition of our logistics capability in the joint world. The Marine Corps is looked upon very favorably by combatant commanders, because we have a logistics system that fits our expeditionary culture.

Dr. Smith: What has being the first Marine Corps flag officer at TRANSCOM meant to you on a personal level?

Gen Hughey: It's something that personally I'm proud of and very pleased with, obviously. And I'm very thankful to be in this position at this particular time. I am an operationally oriented individual. I'm not particularly fond of doing the policy business that you find in Washington [District of Columbia (DC)] and around Headquarters Marine Corps. Quite frankly, I've avoided that. I've spent 35 years in the Marine Corps, and I've done three years in Washington, so I've been pretty successful about staying in the realm that I'm most comfortable with, and where I feel I'm most useful, which is the operational realm.

Dr. Smith: Do you think that having a Marine Corps general officer at your level as the deputy commander has given some new importance to TRANSCOM as a place for Marines to come and do service?

Gen Hughey: There is no lack of requirements or desire on the part of the joint community to have Marines on the staff. Everyone wants more Marines. There aren't enough of us to go around. That's primarily why we went from 69 generals in 1997 to 80, because there just weren't enough to fill all the joint billet requirements. I don't think TRANSCOM is any exception. Again, I'm the first Marine Corps general officer ever to be assigned to TRANSCOM, but there are plenty of Marine Corps general officers out there serving in the joint community. I don't think that coming to TRANSCOM added anything to the stature of the Marine Corps, or that it was something the Marine Corps did to gain any kind of advantage.

Dr. Smith: What's the value added of having a Marine Corps deputy commander?

Gen Hughey: The value added to TRANSCOM or to the Marine Corps?

Dr. Smith: Either one.

Gen Hughey: I think what General Handy liked about me was that I didn't come from a transportation background, and I didn't come here with an agenda. I had

no agenda. I brought a customer's perspective from 33 years of an expeditionary culture, a deployment culture, at a time when this country was in the process of one of the most significant deployments¹ since Operation Desert Shield. This global war on terrorism has required a focus on deployment, sustainment, and the movement of forces, equipment, and supplies. The real value of a Marine in this position at this time is that we were brought up as Marines in a deployment culture, an expeditionary environment, so it is something that we understand and are very comfortable with. That experience has enabled TRANSCOM to help the other Services make their deployments easier than they otherwise would have been.

Dr. Smith: Can you think of any specific examples where it has helped?

Gen Hughey: I recall when I first got here, TRANSCOM was sending out a lot of teams to the Services, whether it be at the MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force],² division, or corps level, to help them plan how they were going to deploy. Deployment is an every day occurrence in the Marine Corps. We do it so much that we're comfortable with it, but having liaisons in place made the planning execution go more smoothly. That was one of the early things we did, sending out these teams to the various bases and stations, forts and camps around the continental United States to ensure that people "got out of Dodge."

Dr. Smith: Do you think having a Marine general officer at your level helped TRANSCOM's relationship with the Marines as customers?

¹ The deployment for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began in the fall of 2002. The operation, the war to remove Saddam Hussein as the ruler of Iraq, commenced on 19 March 2003, and major hostilities ended 1 May 2003. The United States continued to rotate considerable forces into and out of Iraq and neighboring areas approximately every twelve months.

² The Marine Expeditionary Force is the largest Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and the principal Marine Corps combat organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, aircraft wings, and force service support groups.

Gen Hughey: To some degree, but as I said before, I am not here to protect the interests of the Marine Corps or to look out for the Marine Corps. I'm here to look out for TRANSCOM and the combatant commanders. Whatever the combatant commanders need or want, that's our primary focus. Having me here as a Marine didn't do the Marine Corps any more good than it did the Army. That's the way you have to look at it. This idea that you're going out there on joint duty to look out for the interests of your Service is wrong. That is absolutely wrong. The Department of Defense [DOD] is emphasizing joint commands. We are all supposed to be supporting the combatant commanders, the warfighters. They set the priorities, and TRANSCOM needs to make sure that we are familiar with their priorities, very knowledgeable about their priorities, and that we're executing them. Service priorities are secondary to the combatant commander.

The Marine Corps has a reputation here at TRANSCOM as being the easiest force to move. They do their planning. They're ready when they're supposed to be ready, and they move out smartly. Marines know how to load ships and airplanes. They come from this deployment culture. They're expeditionary in the truest sense of the word. I don't think that my presence has enhanced the Marine Corps' reputation, but it probably made it a little easier for Buck Bedard [Marine Corps Lieutenant General Emil R., Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, July 2000 to November 2003] to pick up the phone when there was confusion or a problem and call me. I think he probably felt nearly as comfortable calling General Brown when he was here.

Dr. Smith: You mentioned you had joint experience as well.

Gen Hughey: I've had a lot of joint experience. I started out working for DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] back in the 1980s. Did a tour with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] in the 1990s. In the late 1990s I did a tour

with US Forces Japan as the deputy commander. I worked for two very fine Air Force generals. Quite frankly, they had something to do with me landing this job, because I know they called General Handy and recommended me. The joint arena is something I'm familiar with, something I'm comfortable with. I enjoy it. I know it's the way of the future.

Role of Deputy Commander

Dr. Smith: When you think "deputy commander," you almost think "vice president." You're there to be in charge when the commander is gone or incapacitated. What did General Handy tell you that he wanted you to do as his deputy commander?

Gen Hughey: General Handy and I have what I can only describe as a unique relationship. I don't think he ever sat me down and told me, in an entrance interview, what he expected of the deputy. After the job interview, and after working with him for a very short time, we developed a mutual trust. By that I mean he trusted me to make the right decisions based on the guidance he provided to the entire staff, and I trusted him not to beat me up too badly if I made a mistake. I say it was a unique relationship, because it was absolutely frightening to me initially how much we thought alike. From very early on in the relationship, I was never hesitant to make decisions. There haven't been that many reversed in the two years that I've been here. It really was a relationship based on trust.

It's been an absolute pleasure working for him. He is, without a doubt, the *best* leader--and I've worked for a lot of them--I've ever served under. It's been a pleasure working for him, and it's been an honor, quite frankly, to be at TRANSCOM during this period. There is no place I would rather have been. No place. Because of what we've done, and because of what

we're trying to do with the DPO³ [distribution process owner], I think this is the very apex of logistics within the Department of Defense. I'm a career logistician. Where else would I want to be? Short of having General Handy's job, this is the best. For me to retire from this career, from this position, is a dream come true.

Dr. Smith: Your official position description states that the deputy commander is the principal advisor to the commander. Did you see one of your responsibilities as giving General Handy advice?

Gen Hughey: No, I spent more time sitting at his knee than advising him. [Laughter] He traveled a lot and was so busy when he was here that most of the advice that I might have given him went to the staff, because I was here, and I was making the decisions. It goes back to trust again. If it was something critical that I thought he might get a call about from the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)] or the Secretary [of Defense] or the Deputy Secretary [of Defense], I'd call him up wherever he was in the world and let him know what was going on, or I'd send him an e-mail. But for the most part, General Handy communicates personally with the directors and their deputies. It's very comfortable. There's never been one of those situations where he's been out of touch, or where we didn't feel comfortable talking with him or telling him something.

Again, he's a tremendous leader. He doesn't get his hair on fire. He's nobody to mess with, but he doesn't get upset because you take action. If you were sitting around doing nothing when you should have been doing something, he would get upset. But if you took action, and he didn't particularly think that was the right thing to do, he's not going to get upset with you because you acted. He might counsel you a little bit saying, "I wouldn't have done it that way," but he's not going to "wire brush" you.

³ See pages 30-31 for more information on DPO.

Dr. Smith: Would you say he does a good job of communicating his intent and then letting you take action to move towards that intent?

Gen Hughey: Right. He communicates his intent with all of us at the staff meetings he attends. We've been at this so long, and we've been through some intense times with the deployment process for Operations Enduring Freedom [OEF]⁴ and Iraqi Freedom [OIF]. We sat down with him every day back then, because we had to. We not only had to sit down with him, we had to sit down at the VTCs [video teleconferences] with the COCOMs [combatant commanders], [US]Joint Forces Command [USJFCOM], and members of the Joint Staff. Watching him daily make decisions at that level, it became very clear to us what his intent was. It really wasn't rocket science in terms of figuring out what the boss would want us to do. It was pretty clear. We had that three- or four-month period where we had VTCs on a daily basis, and he sat there, and we arm-wrestled with other staffs, other COCOMs, and the Joint Staff to get the OIF deployment executed.

General Handy is a teacher. He makes his point, and you learn from it. I'm referring to the other staffs, the other COCOMs out there. For this staff, we went to school on him for four months. With the day-to-day things that came up, there really wasn't any question about what to do, what the boss would want us to do.

Dr. Smith: General Handy is dual-hatted as commander of TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command [AMC]. He has to divide his time between the two organizations. What impact did that have on your position?

Gen Hughey: Obviously TRANSCOM is a combatant commander with a four-star billet. Air Mobility Command is a major command, a four-star billet within the

⁴ In Operation Enduring Freedom, which began 7 October 2001, the United States and its coalition partners launched a military operation against the terrorist network of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban government of Afghanistan that shielded them following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.

Air Force. And I would say because of that dual role, General Handy depended a lot more on me and John Baker [Air Force Lieutenant General John R., Vice Commander, AMC, April 2002 to July 2005] over at AMC than most combatant command or major command four-stars would have to depend upon their deputies. He does have to divide his time. As a matter of fact, he spends three days a week here and two days a week over at AMC. I don't know how he does it.

I have welcomed it, because it has given me a lot of opportunity to operate in a somewhat autonomous mode. I like that. It's probably one of my faults. I don't communicate with my superiors as much as some others do. Fortunately I have a boss right now who doesn't take issue with that, as long as I let him know what the crystal balls are that we could potentially drop. He's depended on it. He's needed it. I think the staff and I have come through for him in that regard. He is a tremendously busy person. He has a travel schedule that's phenomenal. I would not want his travel schedule.

Relationship with the Transportation Component Commands

Dr. Smith: Because General Handy was so busy and dual-hatted, did that give you perhaps more direct contact with the component commanders than you might have had in another command?

Gen Hughey: Yes. And I think the rank has a lot to do with it, too. Dave Brewer [Navy Vice Admiral David III, Commander, Military Sealift Command (MSC), August 2001 to March 2006] at MSC is a three-star. I look at John Baker really as the commander of AMC, because he's at the same level I am. And Ann Dunwoody [Army Major General Ann E., Commander, Surface

Deployment and Distribution Command⁵ (SDDC), October 2002 to August 2004]; and now Charlie Fletcher [Army Major General Charles W., Jr., Commander, SDDC, August 2004 to August 2006] who is just getting there and getting his feet on the ground; they deal directly with me. They can pick up the phone and talk directly to the boss, but they'll bounce things off me. For the most part we've been able to keep the boss from having to make or get involved in some of the less critical issues of the day, if you will. For the most part he's been able to sit back and let us take care of the daily operations, although there were times when he had to get right down in the weeds with the daily operations. He is a visionary and has exercised that vision to move us. Where do we want to be two years, five years from now? He's been able to devote a lot of time and energy to that process rather than worrying about the daily execution of the TRANSCOM mission.

Dr. Smith: Do you interact fairly regularly with the component commanders?

Gen Hughey: Yes. Besides e-mails and phone calls, we probably get together once a month. They are at about half the meetings I go to in Washington, and they come here at least on a monthly basis. I would say there is adequate interaction. And again, everyone's very comfortable picking up that phone. I have to tell you, the component commanders know what the boss wants. They understand his intent. And they're all extremely capable individuals and marvelous leaders. There aren't a lot of questions. When Dave Brewer makes a decision about Military Sealift Command, very seldom is there a "why." We generally don't ask because we know Dave Brewer wouldn't be activating a ship without first asking all the right questions. The same can be said of AMC and SDDC. We are a very tight organization. We have to be. The mission is so critical that if you don't

⁵ The Army redesignated the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) the (Military) Surface Deployment and Distribution Command on 1 January 2004 as a result of the USTRANSCOM commander's designation as the distribution process owner and the command's increased emphasis on deployment and end-to-end distribution of surface cargo from depots to combatant commanders.

have your stuff together, someone from outside the command is going to beat you up. We haven't been beat up in a long time. [Laughter] It's a pretty tight ship, but people are not afraid to act. We're not sitting around waiting for the boss, for "Mother, may I?" That's the difference in this command from many others.

Value of the Chief of Staff Position

Dr. Smith: Previous deputy commanders here at TRANSCOM were dual-hatted as the chief of staff. During General Brown's tenure, we received a Reserve general officer billet to perform the chief of staff function. How has that worked out?

Gen Hughey: First of all, we don't have a chief of staff; we have Butch Pair [Army Major General Carlos D. "Butch," Chief of Staff, USTRANSCOM, June 2000 to November 2005]. He has been the sole chief of staff since we started the position. He's an Army transporter and has commanded at every level within transportation in the Army. He knows everyone out there, active, Reserve, and National Guard. He was a very successful businessman and brings tremendous business acumen from the commercial sector. He has tremendous leadership skills. He has a great partner in his wife, Jeannie. The two of them have been a godsend to TRANSCOM. We've been so fortunate to have both of them here.

I can't say enough good things about Butch Pair. Because of that position and Butch's qualifications, I have had the latitude to go where the fire is on a day-to-day basis. He runs the staff. But I would say that where Butch has produced the greatest value added is in the DPO arena, helping us, along with the [TC]J5 [Director of Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Programs, USTRANSCOM]. Butch has a great organizational mind in terms of what type of organization you need to put together to solve a particular problem or to do a study or move this thing ahead. He fathered

the reorganization of TRANSCOM.⁶ He basically developed the TRANSCOM organization, the staff, as it is right now. That's kept me from having to focus on those particular areas. The [TC]J3 [Director of Operations, USTRANSCOM] has taken the operational side. Between the two of them and the J5, I'm able to keep an eye on everything that's going on, plus do some of the visionary stuff with General Handy. This job would have been horrendous had Butch Pair not been here.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Planning for the Deployment

Dr. Smith: When you first arrived at TRANSCOM in August 2002, the planning for Iraqi Freedom was well underway. What were your first impressions of the command and what was going on at that time?

Gen Hughey: Things were really not in sync, and for a very good reason. The entire Department of Defense had been operating under the belief that if we had a major deployment it would follow the TPFDD [time-phased force and deployment data] process.⁷ The Secretary of Defense [(SECDEF) Donald H. Rumsfeld, January 2001 to present] had other ideas. He decided he was going to take a hands-on approach, and that, in my opinion, was a very wise decision. It kept us from sending too much over there, from building too many "steel mountains." He really metered the force. He asked questions. As a result, we didn't say, "Okay, here's [US]CENTCOM's [United States Central Command's] plan for a war in Iraq. Here's the TPFDD that goes with it. Now flow this TPFDD."

⁶ See pages 48-50 for more information on the 2003 reorganization.

⁷ The TPFDD is the information residing in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System that constitutes the database portion of an operation plan. It includes information on the personnel and cargo of in-place units and units to be deployed, along with their priority, desired sequence, and routing; estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted simultaneously with the deployment of forces; and estimates of the transportation requirements.

Under the SECDEF it was, "No, tell me what you need, unit by unit, and as the SECDEF, I will approve that if I agree that it's necessary." So rather than being able to communicate to the entire Department [of Defense] on a certain date that these are the units that are going to go or needed to get ready--a lot of the units were in the Guard and Reserve, and they take more time to prepare because they have to be certified for combat before they deploy--he said, "No, we're going to take these one at a time." We started with the active forces. Unfortunately, the active forces can't move without the Reserves and Guard being in place first because of the way we've structured our Guard and Reserve in some of the Services.

The bottom line is all of the COCOMs were looking to flow a TPFDD, and that's not the way it worked in OIF. As a result, there was a lot of confusion, and confusion bred some contempt. There was some friction, a lot of friction, between TRANSCOM, CENTCOM, Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff would say, "The Secretary of Defense signed the DEPORD, the deployment order. Why can't you move them?" And we'd say, "Well, they're not ready to move," or "CENTCOM wants them all at the same time." One of my favorite sayings was "TRANSCOM can move some of the force all of the time, but we can't move all of the force some of the time." Meaning that you have to spread out the movement. We only have so many assets. We weren't going to go into a CRAF⁸ [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] environment where we can take control of civilian airliners. We weren't going to do that, because it would destroy the airlines. And if we destroyed the airlines, what would we use the next time? They wouldn't be there for us.

⁸ Instituted in 1952, the CRAF program allowed the Department of Defense to augment military airlift capability during contingencies with aircraft from the commercial airlines. Although TRANSCOM relied primarily on volunteer aircraft and crews for the OIF deployment, General Handy did activate the first stage of the long-range passenger aircraft segment of CRAF from 8 February to 18 June 2003.

There was this lack of synchronization, a lot of confusion, and a lot of finger pointing. Here I was in an environment that I knew very little about, trying to sort this out in my own mind first, and then as the new guy on the block, how would I convince some of these old hands at CENTCOM, Joint Forces Command, and on the Joint Staff? It was difficult for me, personally, to communicate the problem. That was my first impression. We were up against the wall. Definitely up against the wall.

Dr. Smith: What did you focus on initially? Was it communication? Straightening out some of these misunderstandings?

Gen Hughey: My initial focus was, "Okay, what's the problem today, and who do I need to talk to? How do we get the Army and the Marine Corps out of town and get them over there?" That was the initial focus. It was a day-by-day thing. Not the thing that a deputy commander probably should be doing, but as it turned out, we all ended up doing exactly that. We were all focused on that. There weren't many long-term looks except for maybe "next month." That was about as long-term as we got, because every day there were issues with the initial deployment.

Dr. Smith: Right after you got here, in late September early-October, there was a TPFDD conference for Operation Iraqi Freedom. We still thought we were going to do the deployment by TPFDD.

Gen Hughey: There were a total of six, none of which were successful.

Dr. Smith: Did you play a role in this planning?

Gen Hughey: Not really. Other than when the J3s⁹ would come to loggerheads and couldn't get past something, then it would get bumped up to me. I'd make a call to the CENTCOM deputy or the Joint Staff or [US]EUCOM [United

⁹ The directors of operations of the joint commands.

States European Command], in some cases, when their forces were involved.

Dr. Smith: Can you recall an issue where you might have had to do that? I know it's been a couple of years.

Gen Hughey: There is no one incident in particular that jumps out. It was just a confusing time for everyone. It was primarily because we were deploying forces by the request for forces [RFF] process rather than the TPFDD.¹⁰ The phone calls were really down in the weeds. CENTCOM would ask for forces. Joint Forces Command was told to provide those forces. CENTCOM provided a date they wanted the forces. Joint Forces Command would say the forces can't be ready by that date. And yet CENTCOM would want us to plan to flow that force on that date when we knew darn well that the troops weren't going to be there to get on the plane or to put equipment on the ship. It was just a total lack of synchronization or understanding as to what had to occur before units picked up and left.

Firsthand Observations of the Deployment

Dr. Smith: I looked at your travel schedule for the past two years, and I noticed on 25 February 2003 you went down to Corpus Christi-Beaumont, Texas. This was during the height of the deployment. What was the purpose of that trip?

Gen Hughey: I wanted to visit the SDDC units at the ports of Corpus Christi and Beaumont, as well as the MSC merchant mariners who were in port at the time. And the reason was, quite simply, they had done a phenomenal job. These were principally Reserve and National Guard units that came

¹⁰ CENTCOM would identify the forces it needed and their required delivery date by issuing a request for forces to the Joint Staff. Joint Forces Command was responsible for sourcing the request from the Services. The Secretary of Defense made the final decision on what forces deployed when by issuing a deployment order.

together, some of them arriving in the middle of the night. It was the middle of the winter. Granted, things aren't too cold down in that part of Texas, but the bottom line was they had done a phenomenal job in getting the 4th Infantry Division and later the 1st Cavalry Division out of Fort Hood [Texas] from the fort to the port, loaded on the ships, and on their way to Southwest Asia. They were executing their mission before they had even completed the administrative activation portion of their orders.

I was down there to pat them on the back, to see what they had done, and to determine what support they might need from us at that particular time, because we were going to do it again. We knew this was going to be a long-term repetitive process. It was a great visit. We have some phenomenal leaders, phenomenal troops--men and women, civilians--doing incredible work with a very small force and able to load those ships and get them out of port. We didn't miss any sailing schedules, everything was on time. For the most part, they were ahead of schedule. Just tremendous.

Dr. Smith: Did they express any concerns or identify any areas where they thought they might need more support?

Gen Hughey: No. It was kind of an attitude of "Bring it on. Where's the next one? Where do you need us? We're ready to go." It was all positive. I can't recall anything that they needed from us or anything that we needed to do differently. As it turned out, mostly I was able to pat some great soldiers and sailors on the back.

Dr. Smith: You also went to Kuwait 12-15 March [2003], which meant that you were there just days before the war started. What was the purpose of that visit?

Gen Hughey: The purpose of that trip was to take a look at what we had established for strategic intertheater distribution from CONUS [continental United States] to Kuwait. How were we organized? Were we going to be able to sustain

the force? Were we going to be able to get the supplies and equipment in there on a timely basis? So each time I did this, I would start out at a port or airfield here in the United States. I flew on our transports, on the C-5A, on both my trips. On this particular trip, I flew into Kuwait and then visited the ports, the airfields, and Camp Arifjan¹¹ to see where we were staging this stuff. Of course, now it's the theater depot both coming and going, supplies going in and retrograde coming out. But at that time it was very rudimentary. This was where we were going to receive things. That was the primary purpose: to familiarize myself with our strategic lift capabilities.

Dr. Smith: What did you find?

Gen Hughey: What I expected for that particular time and place. People were pretty well organized. It was the first time I became aware that we were shipping a lot of stuff by air that didn't need to go by air, but that's because we have dysfunctional, in my opinion, prioritization and air clearance organizations that are run by the separate Services. There needs to be a joint air clearance authority that's sponsored by the combatant command that's receiving the cargo to determine how things ought to be shipped. There was just a lot of stuff that went by air. Fortunately we got it all there, but probably at a greater expense than this nation could have gotten it there for, considering what some of the stuff was. It didn't appear to be for immediate use, it was more for stock. A lot of it could have gone by surface.

Dr. Smith: So you met with our deployed personnel and looked at port operations. Did you also talk with CENTCOM J4 [Director, Logistics, Army Major General Dennis K. Jackson, June 2000-July 2003]?

¹¹ Located outside Kuwait City, Camp Arifjan is a major logistical hub for OIF.

Gen Hughey: Yes. I went up to Camp Arifjan and sat down with the J4 and various other members of the logistics staff. This was long before the CDDOC¹² [CENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center] so it was basically, “What do you need, what do you see, and what can we do better?” At that point in time there was still a lot of confusion.

Dr. Smith: You went back again in the summer, at the end of July-beginning of August. Same route.

Gen Hughey: I took the same route. On my first trip I came back through Charleston [South Carolina] and took a look at the airfield and seaport. I visited both seaports and airfields on both ends. This trip was basically to look at the internal distribution to see what the problems were. What I found contributed to or reinforced our thinking that we really needed some experts in the theater to handle this. There was a lack of synchronization between strategic distribution and operational distribution. We needed to fix that. That was the purpose of that visit.

Dr. Smith: Later on you got very involved in container management. Was this an issue at all as early as the summer of 2003 when you were over there?

Gen Hughey: Not at that point. We were starting to ask the questions: “Why are all these containers stacked up two high in a perimeter type of environment? What’s in them? Are you using stuff out of them?” It really wasn’t too much of an issue at that point. It was starting to become an issue for the Army, because they were paying demurrage¹³ on them, but at that point we really hadn’t sunk our teeth into solving that problem.

¹² See pages 32-33 for information on the CDDOC.

¹³ Demurrage is charges paid for not unloading and returning leased containers to their commercial owners within the time specified in the lease. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, US forces retained thousands of leased containers to use for storage, housing, and field fortifications, costing the Army millions of dollars per month in demurrage.

Dr. Smith: Were there any action items you brought back with regard to our operations or customer feedback?

Gen Hughey: On the first visit, I went over there primarily to see how the force flow was going in terms of getting people over there. It was right on the eve of the war. We had already decided we were going to kick it off, yet we didn't have all the force there. General Handy said, "You need to go over there. Take a look at the system." Basically he wanted me to be familiar with how things were supposed to be working, what the facilities looked like, and that sort of thing. That was a good eye opener in terms of how fast we could conceivably push forces in there with the systems that they had. So I was really looking at movement of people. That was the first visit.

And what did I bring back? Not a whole lot, except an appreciation for the problems they were dealing with on the ground once the forces got there. They had a facility set up to receive forces, but it was pretty rudimentary. We couldn't just slam forces over there. We can easily overwhelm them with people just like we can easily overwhelm a combatant command with sustainment supplies if we don't flow them right. Also, the components within CENTCOM didn't always have an accurate picture of what was going on because they were geographically separated. We'd get calls from Service components complaining about the flow of forces when, in fact, we were, in one case, ahead of their schedule. They just didn't have an accurate picture of what they had in country. It was helpful to me to make that trip in that respect.

On the second trip I was looking primarily at sustainment. How were we moving stuff, and how much stuff was over there? How much stuff was moving by air that should have been moved by surface? We uncovered a lot of that. That was an eye opener. There were some people who were doing things exactly right, and there were others who really weren't aware of what they were doing.

Dr. Smith: On the issue of things that were moving by air that shouldn't be, was that a systemic thing because certain DODAACs¹⁴ [Department of Defense activity address codes] automatically called for airlift?

Gen Hughey: When I was down at the airport of debarkation, actually looking at the documents that were attached to the material that had come in by air, it was very clear to me that this was stuff that unit supply officers ordered before they ever left their post in the United States. The intent was, "I need this for the deployment. I need this now. I've been designated a deploying unit, therefore I rate the highest priority." And so they ordered it under the highest priority. That's what lieutenants and captains do at that level. "The boss wants it, and I'm going to get it." They anticipate that the item is going to come from the local supply source, but when the local supply source doesn't have it, they pass it up to DLA with the same priority. It doesn't change. So that unit deploys, and now they're in Kuwait. Some of what they ordered might have been packing material, for crying out loud! They don't need that air-shipped at that point. That's way beyond what they're concerned about today. Today they are concerned about beans, bullets, and band aids, not packing material.

Packing material is just an example, and it's been overused. But the bottom line is, when they ordered it, they thought they were going to get it in a day or two, and that's the reason they put a high priority on it. They didn't plan on it ever being air-shipped to Kuwait. They got to Kuwait. They've gotten by without it, and perhaps they don't really even need it anymore. But because of the priority and the very poor air challenge authority system that we have among the Services, we air-shipped it. That had something to do with us really moving out hard on this distribution process owner business. How do you deconflict this air and surface transportation?

¹⁴ DODAACs are six-position codes that identify the mailing, shipping, and billing addresses of government agencies and military units.

Overcoming Deployment Challenges

Dr. Smith: We've already talked about the RFF/DEPORD process versus the TPFDD/EXORD [execution order] process impacting our ability to forecast lift requirements. We couldn't determine priorities in sequencing because that kind of information wasn't in the DEPORD, and some units were spread across multiple DEPORDs. You even remarked in the Joint Mobility Operations Center¹⁵ meeting one day, "That when TRANSCOM is coordinating on DEPORDs and the RFF just says 'XXX' passengers, we ought to just reply 'We can move XXX passengers in XXX days,'" meaning that we're being asked to coordinate without specific information with which to make a decision.

Gen Hughey: There was a dysfunctional relationship between TRANSCOM and CENTCOM when it came to that deployment. It all came out of a real lack of understanding on the part of the combatant commander about how the system works, and the confusion that was caused by the difference between DEPORDs, requests for forces, and the old TPFDD methodology. It was a wise decision on the part of the Secretary not to use the TPFDD methodology. He wanted to meter the forces, and we did that. We ended up executing the war with two divisions instead of whatever it was that CENTCOM thought they needed initially. There was just a lot of confusion and a lot of frustration on the part of CENTCOM, from my perspective watching and participating in the VTCs. CENTCOM was trying to fight the war and didn't know what to do about the force flow.

Dr. Smith: How did TRANSCOM overcome that kind of confusion? You mentioned VTCs.

¹⁵ The Joint Mobility Operations Center was the name for TRANSCOM's operations center. The name changed in late 2003 to the Deployment Distribution Operations Center to reflect the change in the command's mission brought about by the distribution process owner responsibility.

Gen Hughey:

Because of an inability to resolve things at the two-star level, we started having four-star meetings, VTCs, three times a week. And this was just to get the initial deployment resolved! We had a number of TPFDD conferences, and they all resulted in no plan. They were failures. It took the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers [Air Force General Richard B., October 2001 to September 2005], sitting in on the VTCs and trying to understand this problem, listening to TRANSCOM, Joint Forces Command, and CENTCOM all explaining their issues. Then he would task people: "Okay, we're going to have VTCs to work this thing out every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. This is Monday; by Wednesday Joint Forces Command, I want you to come back in with this information. CENTCOM, I want you to come back having accomplished these things. And TRANSCOM, I want you to do this." That went on between General Myers and General Pace [Marine Corps General Peter, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 2001 to August 2005] for probably six weeks. Then it boiled back down to the three-star level. These tri-weekly VTCs between the players continued for probably a total of four months to iron out damn near every unit move.

It was a difficult situation, and it took leadership from the Joint Staff to get this thing resolved. Norty Schwartz¹⁶ [Air Force Lieutenant General Norton A., Director for Operations, Joint Staff, October 2002 to October 2004] sat in there after it got toned down to the three-star level. I thought he did an admirable job of remaining dogged in terms of getting what he had to have and getting what he had to have done without seemingly becoming frustrated. [Laughter] He tried to keep things down to a low boil. We finally got our way through that.

I have to tell you, General Myers took most of his counsel from us. We'd tell him this is what we had to do, and then he would take that counsel,

¹⁶ General Schwartz pinned on his fourth star 29 August 2005 and took command of USTRANSCOM on 7 September 2005 as the first USTRANSCOM commander not dual-hatted with AMC.

and we'd have a VTC. He would assign tasks, and they would get accomplished. We managed to get through the darn thing. The lessons we learned from that we then incorporated into subsequent rotations. But we haven't had anything like that since.

Dr. Smith: Whose idea was it to have the VTCs? Was it the Chairman's, or did TRANSCOM suggest it?

Gen Hughey: I don't recall just who said, "Okay, it's time for the four-stars to sit down to get this thing resolved," but when it did happen, the first meeting coincided with General Myers' visit to TRANSCOM. At the very first meeting, there was General Myers sitting next to General Handy at *TRANSCOM*. I'm sure that folks at JFCOM and CENTCOM were somewhat taken aback by these two Air Force four-stars sitting at the head of the table conducting this meeting. If they did, they got over it real fast, and we got down to business, rolled up our sleeves, and things started happening.

Dr. Smith: General Myers came out on 7 February 2003. That was his first visit to Scott Air Force Base [AFB] since 11 September [2001], and part of that, I think, was to thank folks and visit AMC.

Gen Hughey: Yes. He really came out to visit TRANSCOM and give us a boost. I wasn't here during all that period of time, but since 11 September [2001] I think our J3 [Air Force Major General William Welser III, Director of Operations, February 2001 to August 2003] was working sixteen hours a day to make this stuff happen. The people, at the beginning of the war, were really tired because of all they had done in Afghanistan for OEF and then, of course, OIF. It was a morale visit, but as it turned out, after the trip had long since been planned, the VTC was a last minute thing, "Okay we have to do this." It just happened that the Chairman was here, and we said, "Just sit here and attend the VTC at TRANSCOM." That's what he did. Again, it was interesting for me to watch them operate at the four-star

level--the leadership, the fraternity, the collegial atmosphere that they brought to the table. It was really simple stuff. Understanding the problem and then assigning the taskers really isn't rocket science, it just took that level of leadership because of the magnitude of the problems.

Dr. Smith: Some of the other challenges that cropped up during the deployment included access, basing, and overflight. Did you get involved in trying to work any of those issues?

Gen Hughey: Not really. The J3 did most of that. You know, all that is done over at AMC. They have a whole section over there of about twelve people who do nothing but get country clearances and overflight rights. It's a full time job for them. They're totally professional. They've been doing it for years. They know how to do it, so no, TRANSCOM doesn't get involved. If the clearance is denied, they find another route, and that's the way it works.

Dr. Smith: How good was ITV [in-transit visibility] and TAV [total asset visibility]¹⁷ in your estimation?

Gen Hughey: It's getting better each time. We didn't have any when we first started. A war gives you a great sense of urgency, and that's what we've been involved in. There is money available to buy the technology. That's been a big boost. We still have to help people with it, because they don't plan to do it; they don't have the assets to do it. The Air Force has always had the lead in this. A lot of times we have had to send in an Air Force unit, a TALCE [tanker airlift control element]-type of unit that has the capability to sit on an airfield they don't own and provide that capability.¹⁸ The

¹⁷ In-transit visibility is the ability to track people and cargo from origin to destination. Total asset visibility is the capability to provide customers with timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, materiel, and supplies at all times, not just during transit.

¹⁸ The tanker airlift control element is a mobile command and control organization that provides on-site management of airfield operations, including communications, aerial port services, maintenance, security, transportation, weather, intelligence, and other support functions, as necessary.

Army and the Marine Corps have been very quick to get up to speed on it, and then if someone is able to provide them with the assets, they know how to use them.

Comparing Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm With Operation Iraqi Freedom

Dr. Smith: During Desert Shield/Desert Storm,¹⁹ you headed a materiel division at the Marine Corps logistics base in Albany, Georgia. How would you compare and contrast your logistics experience in the first conflict with what you saw in OIF?

Gen Hughey: It's an interesting difference in perspective. We fought the first Gulf War with a Cold War attitude regarding logistics. Just get it off the shelf, get it boxed up, and get it over there. It was the first time ever that we had actually pulled and shipped PWRs, provisional war reserves. It was a twenty-four hour, seven-day-a-week operation. It went on for six months. We built some awesome steel mountains in Kuwait. And I was proud of that! We pulled twenty different PWR packages for the Marine Corps and shipped them and got them there on time.

We simply overwhelmed their ability to receive it. They had all this stuff over there, but they didn't know what it was. It was just containers. They didn't have a system for finding stuff. The whole plan, as it was intended, was they would receive this stuff an item at a time, do some sort of magical field warehousing, and then be able to go get it when they needed it. It became extremely apparent to me right away that that wasn't happening, because people were calling me from Kuwait saying, "I need this, that, or the other," and I knew darn well I had shipped them fifteen of those things. It was simply a matter of "So what? In that container field out there, it's as much use to me as it is in Albany, Georgia." That's when

¹⁹ Operation Desert Shield, defense of Saudi Arabia, 7 August 1990 to 16 January 1991; Operation Desert Storm, liberation of Kuwait, 17 January to 11 April 1991.

it became very apparent to me that this whole Cold War provisional war reserves system was out to lunch, it was of no use to us. Something had to change.

For the Marine Corps' part, it did change. We didn't do that this time. We didn't release PWRs. Everything was shipped because someone had filtered it and determined what was really needed and what was asked for. There were fewer steel mountains. My Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience gave me a lot of the background to look at logistics this time around. The difference this time around was, we didn't want to create steel mountains. We didn't want a large footprint of sustainment in theater. We wanted to flow it. It was never our intent to adopt just-in-time logistics, but rather not to put more than thirty days of supplies on the ground at a time. Keep things in the pipeline. The pipeline is part of the sustainment, and if you can see what's in that pipeline, then you are miles and miles ahead. Thirty days on the ground and see what's in the pipeline. When that was followed, and when we were able to attain that, it was more than adequate.

Dr. Smith: And that's where the ITV comes in?

Gen Hughey: That's where the ITV and TAV come in.

Lessons Learned

Dr. Smith: How did our customers, in particular CENTCOM, the Army, and the Marines--since the Army and the Marines had the bulk of the stuff that was moved--perceive TRANSCOM's performance during OIF?

Gen Hughey: Except during the few occasions when *they* lost the bubble, and by that I mean they didn't realize what had already arrived, it was extremely smooth and appreciated by both the Army and the Marine Corps. I haven't found anyone who has any real complaint about it. As a matter of

fact, they all shake their heads in wonderment and say, "How did you guys do that? You must be extremely busy up there. It must be a crazy place." I tell them, "No. Actually it's not crazy. People are busy. People are tired. But there's a system, and it's working, and as long as we continue talking, it will continue to work." I know that TRANSCOM's stock within the Services, within the Washington DC area, inside the Beltway, and with the combatant commands most importantly, is very high. They look to us to solve problems. And solve problems *right now!* Not a year from now, not six months from now. "Here's a problem, John Handy, can you help me?" And they are confident that they're going to get a positive response, and it's going to happen quickly. We just hope we can continue to deliver like that. [Laughter]

Dr. Smith: Was part of your role during OIF then to help educate customers about the process, so that they'd know where the problems lay, and what needed to be fixed?

Gen Hughey: No. My role was more to keep people talking. There were a few occasions when I got calls from Buck Bedard at Headquarters Marine Corps, or Cody [Army General Richard A., Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters United States Army, August 2002 to June 2004] at US Army headquarters, looking into things. In most cases, I was running bad rumors to ground. Clearing things up. Educating the customer and fixing problems were mostly done at the J3 level.

Dr. Smith: What do you think were the key lessons learned for TRANSCOM as a result of OIF?

Gen Hughey: Basically the combatant commander is looking for someone to take charge of sustainment and distribution. It was easy to do that. [Laughter] We didn't have a big fight with CENTCOM over sending them a DDOC

[Deployment Distribution Operations Center],²⁰ for instance. They realize that they have to keep their focus at the operational and tactical levels of war, and they are really willing to depend on someone else to make sure that what's happening at the strategic level and what they're doing at the operational and tactical levels of war are synchronized, and that the seams between those various levels are smooth. The combatant commanders look to us for solutions to the movement of forces and sustainment, strategically and operationally. We're helping them synchronize that seam between operational and tactical. When there are big issues, when you have a conflict like this within the logistics arena, there aren't so many turf battles. Combatant commanders don't seem to get offended by us offering to help them with their responsibilities.

Dr. Smith: How would you compare and contrast the subsequent rotations of forces in Iraq that started in late 2003 with the original deployment?

Gen Hughey: The later rotations were a lot smoother. During the original deployment, we had ironed out a lot of the issues in terms of how we coordinate the movement that starts with a request for forces. Who does what to whom? The Army learned a lot of lessons with regard to how long it takes to mobilize a reserve unit. The subsequent rotations were smooth. They could have been more difficult, because there was two-way traffic by then, but that actually helped. We were able to be more efficient with making sure planes were loaded both ways. General Handy was very adamant about it. It was almost as though he was counting empty seats. That was something that we focused on, so it's been a lot smoother.

I would hope that we gathered enough data and enough documentation that if we ever have another deployment--and we will--a pure deployment, that it will go much smoother. There have been a lot of lessons learned. If you're going to get into a major conflict, you're going to need the Guard

²⁰ See pages 32-33 for more information on the CDDOC.

and Reserves. Combatant commanders now have more realistic expectations as to how quickly forces will be available. And deployments aren't transportation-dependent. It has a lot more to do with mobilization than it does with transportation. As we've always said, and General Handy has been very adamant about it, we can get an airplane to an airport faster than you can get the troops there. And that is always going to be the case.

Dr. Smith: One of the things the Services did was to start the mobilization process with the RFF and not wait for the DEPORD. Initially they were waiting for the DEPORD before they would officially start the mobilization, which put things way behind the curve.

Gen Hughey: Right. There is a lot of bureaucratic stuff that has to happen with an RFF before it becomes a DEPORD, but that's not to say that the unit that is designated in the RFF can't be getting ready. And they weren't before; they were waiting on the DEPORD.

Logistics Transformation

Distribution Process Owner

Dr. Smith: Distribution transformation is one aspect of the larger issue of logistics transformation. In a 16 September 2003 memo, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld designated USTRANSCOM as the distribution process owner.²¹ From your perspective, what has been the impact of this new authority on TRANSCOM over the last year?

Gen Hughey: It has legitimized our change in focus. Clearly this had taken place long before we ever received the memo. The memo legitimized our focus in the eyes of the other staffs, primarily within CONUS, because we never

²¹ DPO responsibilities included improving the "overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities – deployment, sustainment and redeployment support during peace and war," and serving as "the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the Strategic Distribution system."

had a problem with giving support to the combatant commanders. We could have given them a DDOC a year before we were designated the DPO, and they would have accepted it. But that memo legitimized our role with regard to the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], Joint Forces Command, the supply agencies within the Services, and DLA. It made it easier for us to bring people together and to lead an effort. And that's really all it takes. Being designated the DPO gives us a legitimate leadership role in solving problems, smoothing things out, making distribution more efficient and more effective. That's what it did for us.

Dr. Smith: Has there been any opposition to TRANSCOM having that role?

Gen Hughey: No. Not at all. We didn't take the role from someone else. It was created. We were already working on it. There was friction at one time between DLA and TRANSCOM with regard to who was going to be the boss of whom.²² As it turned out, because of the personalities involved, we have a wonderful working relationship with Defense Logistics Agency to the benefit of the warfighter! And that's what it all boils down to. That's what's really important.

²² See pages 36-38 for information on the TRANSCOM/DLA partnership.

United States Central Command Deployment Distribution Operations Center

Dr. Smith: You started to touch on this already, but what is your assessment of the contribution of the CENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center²³ in improving theater logistics, sustainment, and distribution?

Gen Hughey: It's twofold. We now have people in the theater who really understand the organization that they are supposed to be providing support to. To a great degree when there is a problem, we have someone in the CDDOC who can say, "I know how to fix that" before they are ever asked. Being there and having situational awareness as to what the combatant command is dealing with is number one. That gives the CDDOC the ability to act rather than react. They have their finger on the pulse. They're listening to tactical nets. They're anticipating logistics issues. They know whether or not their organization can contribute to the resolution of that issue. There are representatives from many different agencies in the CDDOC: TRANSCOM, DLA, Air Force Materiel Command [AFMC], Army Materiel Command [AMC]. They are there together and have knowledge of the entire logistics infrastructure in the continental United States. The combatant commands never had that before. That's a big help.

Number two, the CDDOC has what we call "reachback." The folks in the CDDOC are very comfortable with picking up the phone and calling their buddies at DLA, TRANSCOM, Air Force Materiel Command, Army Materiel Command, Marine Corps Logistics Command and indicating, "Here's the problem and here's what we need, can you help?" So you have people with this reachback capability.

²³ The CDDOC was one of the first DPO initiatives and was designed to provide USCENTCOM with a TRANSCOM-like entity to work on joint transportation and distribution issues in the theater of operations at the combatant commander level. The first personnel from TRANSCOM, the components, the Services, DLA, and other agencies selected to operate the CDDOC deployed to Kuwait on 16 January 2004.

Then you have the expertise, once you get the flow started, to synchronize the seams--what used to be seams--between the strategic flow and the operational flow. Now it really is all the way from fort to foxhole, from CONUS all the way to the battalion level. We have visibility now of all of the spokes, like the theater distribution center and the corps distribution center. If there is a problem or a backlog at any of those places, a lack of capability or a change in priorities, the CDDOC is able to stop the flow and hold things at the right place. That's a tremendous capability. Expertise, reachback, knowledge, and being situationally aware of what is going on in the theater are all big advantages. That's what makes the CDDOC successful.

Logistics Transformation Structures

Dr. Smith: You've participated in a lot of committees with respect to logistics transformation, the Joint Logistics Board²⁴ [JLB], the Joint Logistics Group²⁵ [JLG], our own Distribution Transformation Task Force²⁶ [DTTF], etc. Tell me about your role on these committees.

Gen Hughey: I'm TRANSCOM's primary representative on everything that happens in the logistics arena at the Department of Defense level. It's myself and Admiral Lippert [Vice Admiral Keith W., Director, DLA, July 2001 to July 2006] at DLA; the JS-J4, Admiral Holder [Vice Admiral Gordon S., Director of Logistics, Joint Staff, September 2001 to August 2004], and

²⁴ The Joint Logistics Board was co-chaired by the deputy undersecretary of defense for logistics and material management and the Joint Staff J4, and composed of the most senior logisticians from the Services, Joint Staff, USTRANSCOM, and DLA to recommend improvements in DOD logistics and supply chain management.

²⁵ The JLG was a subordinate body of the JLB to ensure vetting of key joint logistics issues and proposals at the one- and two-star level, prior to or in lieu of review by the JLB.

²⁶ The TRANSCOM deputy commander chaired the DTTF, which included senior logisticians from OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, DLA, and the combatant commands to advise the distribution process owner on process improvements.

now General McNabb²⁷ [Air Force Lieutenant General Duncan J., Director of Logistics, Joint Staff, August 2004 to October 2005]; and the Services' installation and logistics deputies. All of these things run together in my mind. It's hard to keep track of which meeting you're going to, who the members are, what's the point, and what's the mission of that particular organization, because we have a lot of redundancy in that arena.

Dr. Smith: Do you think it's too bureaucratic?

Gen Hughey: I think there are too many different groups composed of the same people working on the same problems.

Dr. Smith: We saw some of that here within the structure we set up in TRANSCOM with the Distribution Working Group²⁸ [DWG] seeming to involve the same people working the same issues as the Distribution Transformation Task Force.

Gen Hughey: I think we smoothed that out a lot. At least, we focused the efforts within the DPO with this Distribution Transformation Task Force. We have that pretty well streamlined. That's working very well. We're making headway. I don't see the quick gains at the JLB, JLG, or those other organizations. You have to remember that TRANSCOM is a very operationally oriented organization. When we decide to do something, we usually get it done pretty quickly.

Dr. Smith: Let's look specifically at the Distribution Transformation Task Force. You chair it. Since it met for the first time in December 2003, there have been five meetings. The last one was in August 2004. Are you pleased

²⁷ General McNabb received Senate confirmation of his promotion to four-star on 3 October 2005 and assumed command of the Air Mobility Command on 14 October 2005.

²⁸ A level below the DTTF, the Distribution Working Group, composed of one-star logisticians from across DOD and chaired by the TCJ5, vetted the work of the integrated process teams (IPTs) established by the DTTF.

with the progress that's been made?

Gen Hughey: I am now. I wasn't initially. I'm a very impatient person. It didn't seem like we were making any headway. We were having too many fights at the colonel level. I'm a "POA&M" guy, plan of action and milestones. Tell me what you're going to do, when you're going to do it, what the steps are in between, and when are you going to arrive at completion of those steps. Then come back in and tell me where you are. That's the way I like to do things. It just wasn't happening very fast. Quite frankly, it was too big to get my arms around. There were something like eleven different IPTs [integrated process teams]. What we did was reorganize and form those IPTs under four general officers, and since then I'm much happier with the progress that's been made.²⁹ It covers the full spectrum of distribution. And we may add another pillar. When we get to certain areas of accomplishment and we see where we need to bring someone else into the fold because of coordination and synchronization issues, we'll form another pillar, put another flag officer in charge. I see the DTTF as a living, breathing organization that is going to be subject to change and is going to continue for awhile. The DTTF keeps the Services and the COCOMs informed and makes recommendations to the Executive Board.³⁰ The real decisions are made at that next level.

Dr. Smith: Do you think that another pillar is needed?

Gen Hughey: There may be a pillar that's required because of this JDPO--joint deployment process owner--responsibility that Joint Forces Command

²⁹ In the summer of 2004, to speed up change and provide better control over the proliferation of IPTs, General Handy eliminated the DWG and organized IPTs into six functional groupings or pillars--execution, integrated distribution, financial, information technology, human realm, and process--each headed by a general/flag officer or senior executive service member from TRANSCOM or DLA.

³⁰ Created to oversee the DPO process, the DPO Executive Board met for the first time on 18 October 2004. It consisted of General Handy, Vice Admiral Lippert, Lieutenant General Duncan McNabb, and Mr. Bradley Berkson, Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L).

owns.³¹ We may need another pillar to synchronize the JDPO with the DPO.

Dr. Smith: Do you see that authority, the JDPO, being combined in TRANSCOM along with the distribution process owner?

Gen Hughey: Not really. There's an attempt to do that, but it's turning out to be the same turf fight we had with OSD with regard to DLA and TRANSCOM.³² It's a turf battle that, in my opinion, is just going to expend energy and produce nothing, so it's better to come together like we did with DLA and say, "Okay, we can work on this. We can figure out where the fifty yard line is, and we can do this as a partnership rather than taking back the deployment process."

Relationship Between United States Transportation Command And the Defense Logistics Agency

Dr. Smith: Before 16 September 2003 TRANSCOM had been advocating making DLA a component of TRANSCOM. Your predecessor, General Brown, worked hard on that issue. You have said that the TRANSCOM-DLA partnership is working well. Is that because of personalities? Will it continue to work if the personalities change?

Gen Hughey: Keith Lippert and I had an understanding that it was really up to the two organizations to come together in some way, regardless of who ended up in charge--if there was one in charge of the other. Even though there was a food fight going on, underneath there was an understanding that when it

³¹ The Secretary of Defense designated United States Atlantic Command, later redesignated US Joint Forces Command, as the joint deployment distribution owner on 23 October 1998 to solve joint deployment and redeployment process functions that span functional and organizational boundaries.

³² Shortly after assuming command in November 2001, General Handy proposed to the Secretary of Defense that DLA, whose director reports to USD AT&L, be made a component of TRANSCOM to integrate strategic transportation and wholesale supply functions under one combatant commander. After two years of study and political infighting, the SECDEF made TRANSCOM the distribution process owner, but left DLA aligned under USD AT&L.

was all said and done, we were going to have to work together. There was an effort on the part of Keith Lippert and myself not to create too much bad blood between the staffs, to try to keep that down to a low boil, and eventually it worked out. There was a meeting of the minds between OSD, General Handy, and Keith Lippert. I think we've done a masterful job of overcoming the bad blood that was created during that year, year and a half, when that food fight was going on. I don't know who started it, and I'm not sure that's even important at this point.

Dr. Smith: Do you think there are some areas where the working relationship between DLA and TRANSCOM still needs to be improved?

Gen Hughey: Yes. I don't have any specifics, but it's a relationship that we have to continue to foster. We can't take it for granted. I don't know of any specific issues. We both want the same thing. We want superb support to the warfighter. And we want to do it most effectively and most efficiently. Working together, we can do that, and we are doing that. A good example is the forward depots that DLA is moving into the theater,³³ and the intent in the future to establish forward depots as soon as the deployment occurs, rather than waiting two years.

Dr. Smith: Do you think the relationship we have together has helped DLA be more operational in their thinking?

Gen Hughey: Yes! And they've helped us. It's a two-way street. We have a better understanding of what their requirements are. They have a better understanding of what our capabilities are. Because of our mutual desire to do the right thing by the combatant commander, we're able to work very closely together, and with a great deal of camaraderie. I think right

³³ On 30 August 2004, DLA opened a warehouse and distribution center in Kuwait just outside Camp Arifjan that stocks, packs, and ships high demand supply items to military units throughout Southwest Asia. Plans are underway to create a deployable distribution center that can be sent forward much earlier in a contingency. The benefits of forward stockage include less need for transporting supply items by air from the United States, shorter customer wait times, and reduced costs.

now we have a very healthy, very good personal relationship with the leadership at DLA. It's a partnership that will just get better and better with time.

Theater Logistics Issues in United States Pacific Command

Dr. Smith: You went to Korea and [US]PACOM [United States Pacific Command] last August for an exercise and to discuss theater logistics issues. How did the trip go?

Gen Hughey: The trip reflected our success in creating the CENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center. Word of that got to General LaPorte [Army General Leon J., Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command and Commander, United States Forces Korea, May 2002 to February 2006] in Korea, and he said, "I don't know what this thing is, but I've heard about what they're doing, and I want one." Korea is a theater that is ripe for a DDOC, because it is a very mature theater. Over the years since the armistice,³⁴ every time there has been an issue or a new problem with distribution, the US and Republic of Korea [ROK] forces created a new entity, a new agency to handle it. There are a number of logistics-oriented units, if you will, in Korea that are all stovepiped. They all do their own thing, and they very seldom work together to create the efficiencies that are possible.

In terms of infrastructure, Korea is a very modern country. It has good rail, great roads, good airports and facilities, and a marvelous coastal ferry system. The transportation network in Korea is probably better than it is in the United States, when you look at the size of the country and the

³⁴ On 27 July 1953 the military armistice agreement between the United Nations Command, the North Korean People's Army, and the Chinese Communist Forces went into effect. The armistice provided for an armed truce to end hostilities, a demarcation line between North and South Korea, a demilitarized zone on either side of that line, and procedures for the exchange of prisoners of war.

flexibility that they have with regard to transportation. The difficulty that General LaPorte has is not only does he run a sub-unified command,³⁵ but everything he does has to be coordinated with the Koreans. It's a combined organization.

We went out there to take a look at what we, TRANSCOM, thought we might be able to do to bring some of these agencies together and synchronize their efforts to make distribution more effective and efficient for the warfighter. A TRANSCOM team had gone out there during RSO&I³⁶ [reception, staging, onward movement, and integration] in the spring at General LaPorte's invitation and had done an assessment. And we went back out there in August during Ulchi Focus Lens³⁷ to give him a feel for what we had come up with. We presented that to General LaPorte's staff, and then we had about thirty minutes with General LaPorte to give him the brief. It was all very well received.

US Forces Korea is a sub-unified command under PACOM, so it was very important that we also went to PACOM to brief the staff there. There's always been, I guess, this little bit of friction as to who does what for whom with regard to logistics in the Korean theater, and PACOM didn't want to be left out. They want a DDOC. PACOM is certainly not Korea-centric. There are a lot of other areas of concern within PACOM. It's the biggest of all the combatant commands in area of responsibility. So we briefed them on where we were in terms of helping them establish a PDDOC [PACOM DDOC].

³⁵ A command established by commanders of unified commands to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must authorize establishment of a sub-unified command.

³⁶ Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration/Foal Eagle is an annual joint and combined exercise held in the spring in the Republic of Korea that tests the ability of the Republic of Korea to defend itself with the assistance of US forces.

³⁷ Ulchi Focus Lens is an annual joint and combined command post exercise held in the summer in the Republic of Korea to test plans for the defense of the Republic of Korea.

The important point here is that when we went to CENTCOM, they needed someone to stop the bleeding. They needed something fixed right now. And the only way to do that was to take our authorities as the DPO and create the CDDOC. Build it, train it, and put it in place for them and say, "Okay, here it is. It's yours. Now you command it." We can't do that with every combatant command. We simply cannot do that. And we don't intend to continue doing it in CENTCOM. As soon as we can find a way, and as soon as CENTCOM can find the time and the energy to devote to it, CENTCOM needs to reorganize its own assets and develop this DDOC capability.

Now, they will always need some "pros from Dover."³⁸ That's not my terminology, that's what the COCOMs are calling us. The people we send out there are the "pros from Dover." You need people who have the reachback and the knowledge of their own organization. If you recall, the DDOC is not only composed of people from TRANSCOM, it's people from all of our components, from DLA, from the Air Force Materiel Command, the Army Materiel Command, the Marine Corps Logistics Command, and finally the Navy N4 [Fleet Readiness and Logistics Directorate]. There is always going to be a requirement to have some of those people. Do we need the numbers that we sent out there? We can't afford it, and I really don't believe we need that many people. Once combatant commands get used to the procedure, and they build their own organizations, I think we'll quickly find that it's not going to require all that many people from us.

Should we train up more people who are area-specific? I mean, should we have a PACOM cell in our own DDOC that would deploy forward? Should we have a CENTCOM cell? Should we have cells for each of the combatant commands? Probably so. That way when an individual comes

³⁸ Slang phrase for outside consultants brought in to troubleshoot a problem. The phrase originated in the 1968 book *M*A*S*H* by Richard Hooker.

to TRANSCOM and is assigned to the Korean cell in our DDOC, he or she can become very familiar with the war plans, do all the exercises out in Korea, and become immersed in that COCOM's logistics culture, so that when he or she does deploy as one of the "pros from Dover," there is no getting up to speed; that individual is ready to start working.

So the rationale behind our visit was to explain to General LaPorte and to the PACOM staff what we were up to, and what our thinking was in the long-term, in terms of, "You really have the assets here to do this. You just need to reorganize a bit and then we can provide you some 'pros from Dover.'"

Dr. Smith: You talk about Korea being a joint and a combined theater. Are there plans to make a KDDOC [Korean DDOC] that would be a combined US and Korean entity?

Gen Hughey: You're going to have to make it combined, because you're going to have to have representatives in there from what they call the Combined Transportation Movement Center [CTMC]. That is a combined organization that controls all commercial traffic during a contingency. The CTMC has been under-funded and under-focused, if you will, and the ROK/US Combined Forces Command is just now starting to realize the importance of this organization. It's commanded by a Korean general officer with a US colonel as the deputy. That organization needs to be fleshed out, made a little more robust, and given the IT [information technology] it needs. That's where the CTMC has really been behind, because it didn't have the IT to do all the things people were expecting it to do. The CTMC was given a mission and then let go. The only time you ever see or hear from the CTMC is during Ulchi Focus Lens and RSO&I. No one really knows what it is and what it's supposed to do. That's a challenge.

The KDDOC is going to have to be combined, because there is a tremendous amount of commercial traffic in Korea. The intratheater business will be key. The CTMC is going to be key to making the distribution process work smoothly at the operational level of war. We're going to have to have representatives from them with us or representatives from us with them.

Dr. Smith: Clearly DDOCs aren't "one size fits all." The concept is universal, but the application is going to vary by theater and by circumstance.

Gen Hughey: Right. A very good example of that was the excursion down in Haiti.³⁹ We sent three or four people from SDDC and told them to function as the DDOC forward. And they were able to do that. We never built up excess supplies. We never overwhelmed the task force commander. He was in control of the flow, which is exactly what we wanted. That worked out perfectly. It was a very good example of how tailorable the DDOC is. Three or four people were all that were involved in that.

Dr. Smith: You raised the issue of whether TRANSCOM ought to have cells or groups of people who are focused on other theaters to help work the exercises and work with the DDOCs there. Do you see that as a role for reservists?

Gen Hughey: Not necessarily. I don't see a specific role for reservists. For us to say, "Oh, that's a good role for a reservist" is the wrong approach. They don't have to work in the cell all the time, but there has to be some active duty personnel in those cells who are totally familiar with the theater and have the reachback capability. To make it a reservist billet is not a good idea at all, because in a conflict we sometimes don't get the person we were counting on getting when mobilization starts. We end up with someone

³⁹ On 29 February 2004 President George W. Bush ordered US Marines into Haiti as part of an international stabilization force after the Haitian president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, left the country following two years of violence and political upheaval. The intervention, called Operation Secure Tomorrow, lasted until July 2004.

who's filling a billet but knows absolutely nothing about TRANSCOM. They're fine if we can keep them here, because then we can bring them along. But to take somebody like that and send them to Korea, they really don't have the reachback, they don't know anybody in the organization, and they don't have the knowledge of how we operate. So that's not a good job for the reservists.

Joint Theater Logistics Commander Initiative

Dr. Smith: Let's look at the bigger theater picture. TRANSCOM, and General Handy especially, has become the proponent of the joint theater logistics [JTL] commander or organization. It would be on a par with the combined force air component commander, the combined force land component commander, or the combined force special operations component commander.⁴⁰ What can you tell me about that, and how that has been developing?

Gen Hughey: Joint theater logistics is critical. As I've said before, this nation has tremendous strategic logistics capability. So tremendous that we can easily overwhelm any combatant command anywhere, anytime. We can just load him up to the extent that he can't process it. He simply cannot accept it. And we've done it. We did it in the first Gulf War. We started to do that in Afghanistan until we got a handle on the situation.

At the tactical level of war, we're also very good. The Services have husbanded their resources to the extent that when they have to move something around the battlefield at the tactical level, they're very good at it. When you get to the division level or the FSSG [Force Service Support Group] at the Marine Corps level and below, the Army and Marines have

⁴⁰ The combined force air, land, and special operations component commanders are the commanders within a combined command (made up of US and allied forces) responsible for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air, land, and special forces; and planning and coordinating air, land, and special forces operations respectively.

the trucks, airplanes, and the helicopters to do a very good job of distributing supplies on the battlefield.

It's at the operational level of war, which is supposed to be synchronizing the strategic flow with the tactical ability to distribute, that we fall apart. We fall apart there because no one has really been given the responsibility or the wherewithal to pull it off. The person who's most concerned about that, and who needs to be able to control distribution at the operational level, is the combatant commander. It's clearly his responsibility. Yet he has no force that he can assign to that mission. It doesn't exist. If he wants to do anything as a combatant commander in line with the priorities that he's set, he has to go begging for forces to do that. Or he has to task the force that wasn't expecting to have to do that. From what I've seen during my career, we, the warfighters, desperately need something at the theater level, at the operational level of war, working under the combatant commander, that can provide logistics support and distribution. And that is a joint logistics theater command.

A lot of this comes from my own culture. In the Marine Corps our Marine Air-Ground Task Force [MAGTF]--which is how we fight--consists of a headquarters, a command and control element, a ground combat element, an air combat element, and a combat service support element. The MAGTF commander uses the combat service support element to coordinate logistics support and distribution within the battle space. That's at the tactical level. If you move that up one notch to the operational level of war, you just need the same thing. We have a CFLCC, a combined force land component commander, who does the ground stuff. We have a CFACC, a combined force air component commander. But we don't have a combined force combat service support or logistics commander. That's what the joint theater logistics command would provide to the COCOM. That command would be responsible for

synchronizing strategic flow with tactical distribution, which is the problem that we have today.

TRANSCOM is going to have a key role in establishing that. The command has been at work on it now for eighteen months, trying to get people to understand the importance and the requirement for this. The Army and the Marine Corps are sold on it. They fully understand that yes, that's what we all need. TRANSCOM has had some resistance from the Air Force, and to some extent the Navy, but not much. The problem with the Navy and the Air Force is they shrug their shoulders and ask, "Why? Everything is fine with us. What do we need this for?" The reason that they feel this way is because the port of debarkation, whether it is a seaport or an airport, in most cases is the end of the line for them. They don't really have tactical distribution requirements that they need to synchronize. Usually when it gets to a port, they're done. We're just trying to do the same thing for the Army and the Marine Corps, so that when we hand off responsibility at the port of debarkation, there's an agency responsible for getting the cargo from the port of debarkation to the tactical distribution command, if you will. That doesn't exist today. I think it's going to, and TRANSCOM is going to play a key role in making that happen.

Dr. Smith: We've talked about the Services. What do the combatant commanders think about the concept?

Gen Hughey: Right now, as of November of 2004, CENTCOM is really where the sense of urgency is. That's where everyone recognizes that we need it, but, quite frankly, that's one chip too many. General Abizaid [Army General John P., Commander, United States Central Command, July 2003 to the present] has other, more urgent, concerns. He's trying to fight a war. When it comes to spending chips or calling in chips, he's very reluctant to use any in the logistics arena, because everything is sort of working. It's

going to be up to TRANSCOM to drive this through the Tank⁴¹ and establish doctrine. We probably have some really great possibilities in Korea and in Europe to establish joint theater logistics commands, because they can focus on it right now. They can spend some political capital to make this happen. I think that's really our best opportunity to establish a joint theater logistics command within a combatant command's AOR [area of responsibility]. Right now the focus needs to be on Korea and Europe.

Dr. Smith: How is it that we have the lead? Is it because we are a combatant command and from our perspective can see these seams?

Gen Hughey: I think it's the distribution issue. TRANSCOM is the one most impacted, and as the DPO, we're responsible from factory to foxhole. TRANSCOM is real good from factory to port of debarkation, but how do we get it from there to the foxhole? That's our issue. If that's our mission, if that's our responsibility, then it's incumbent on us to say, "Hey, here's the problem. Here's what we need to create to do that." But clearly it's not a TRANSCOM mission; it's something that needs to be in the toolbox of every combatant commander, because that's how we'll do throughput.

Dr. Smith: Has the joint theater logistics command concept been scheduled to go to the Tank?

Gen Hughey: No. And I don't know that we're ready for that. We really need to get Korea and EUCOM on board first. If we went to the Tank right now, we'd have total support from the Army and the Marine Corps, but the biggest contender would be the Air Force, and they are powerful. So we have to get some combatant commands to go along with this thing for us to be able to brief the Tank. Our greatest ally is General Schoomacher

⁴¹ The Tank is the informal name for the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room in the Pentagon, which is also known as the Gold Room. The Tank is used for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff chaired by the Chairman or Vice Chairman; the Operations Deputies of the Services, chaired by the Director, Joint Staff; or the Deputy Operations Deputies, chaired by the Vice Director, Joint Staff, to address issues requiring approval of all the Services.

[Army General Peter J, Chief of Staff of the Army, August 2003 to the present], because he's already said he'd give up the theater support command for a joint theater logistics command. That will be the nucleus. But the other Services will have to pony up resources as well. That scares me, because they have all their eggs in the tactical distribution basket, which they do very well, and we certainly don't want to mess with that. But we have to come up with something, whether it's an additional structure or the Reserves, that is absolutely committed to theater logistics. I don't know how we are going to do it. Clearly, there is going to have to be some restructuring of the active duty force.

Dr. Smith: It's partially a force structure issue?

Gen Hughey: It is. Very much so.

Dr. Smith: I've heard it said that the theater DDOC then would essentially be the operations center for the joint theater logistics command.

Gen Hughey: There will be more to a joint theater logistics command than distribution. The DDOC will be best positioned there rather than under the J4.

Dr. Smith: Because it's a command and control execution agency, a tasking authority?

Gen Hughey: Yes.

USTRANSCOM Reorganization

Dr. Smith: Your predecessor, Lieutenant General Dan Brown, spearheaded a reorganization of the command that was based in part on a mandated 15 percent manpower reduction that we were facing.⁴² That new organization was implemented in early 2003. Part of the restructuring involved breaking up the [TC]J3/4 [Operations and Logistics Directorate, USTRANSCOM], moving some of those J4 functions into the J5, and assigning the rest elsewhere in the command. From your perspective, has that reorganization that we put into effect in early 2003 worked out?

Gen Hughey: Dan Brown spearheaded this reorganization, but when I came here and took his place, I was not the spearhead. Butch Pair, our chief of staff, is really the guy who drove that. The success of the reorganization, in my opinion and during my watch anyway, is totally attributable to Butch Pair and his leadership. He put that thing together. He drove it home. It was his baby. As far as I'm concerned, he's what got us through this very challenging last twenty-six months that I've been here. Extremely successful. We've just been blessed to have a chief of staff of his caliber.

Dr. Smith: Do you think we need to reexamine our structure for the DPO?

Gen Hughey: Continuous process improvement requires you to continually look at your organization. And we are doing that.

Dr. Smith: Do you think the DPO mission is going to require some organizational changes in TRANSCOM?

⁴² In 2002 the Secretary of Defense levied a 15 percent manpower reduction on combatant commands to promote efficiencies and offset manpower requirements for the new US Northern Command activated 17 April 2002. To implement these cuts, General Handy formed a Brain Trust headed by the chief of staff and comprised of the directors to develop an optimal organization. Among the changes, TRANSCOM streamlined the directorate of operations and logistics (TCJ3/4) by moving the logistics, plans, future requirements, training and exercises, lessons learned, and process improvement functions to the directorate of plans and policy (TCJ5), which was renamed the directorate of strategy, plans, policy, and programs, leaving an operations directorate (TCJ3) dedicated to warfighter operations.

Gen Hughey: It already has within the J3 and certainly within the planning aspects of the J5. There have been changes to the organization, but I think it reflects the flexibility of the organization that was organized under Butch Pair's leadership.

Dr. Smith: What about some of the skill sets in our work force as a result of DPO? Are we going to need to develop some supply chain management or engineering expertise?

Gen Hughey: There will be some of that, but I think we're doing a pretty good job because of our relationship with DLA. That's where the real expertise lies in terms of inventory management. We have the expertise in movement. When we put our two heads together, that's when things get done. That's the best way to do it, because if you try to bring experts in here, then it looks like it's coming from TRANSCOM. That's not what we want. We want it to be a mutually agreed upon efficiency between DLA, TRANSCOM, and our other logistics partners.

Dr. Smith: As part of the 2003 reorganization, there was a surface cell established in the TRANSCOM DDOC. That seems to have worked out pretty well in coordinating surface transportation with the components, providing the oversight, reachback, and so on. Do you think it's time to start thinking of establishing a single surface component command under TRANSCOM?

Gen Hughey: We looked at that. We looked at taking the part of MSC that's dedicated to TRANSCOM, pulling that out and planting it in SDDC, and just having one surface command. But there is far too much expertise within Military Sealift Command. They know this business better than anyone else, and we would really lose something if we somehow took them out of the picture. We need that command and the relationship that they've established with the commercial industry--which is a very good one--to continue. I see a continuous and closer partnership in terms of what they do. Maybe TRANSCOM promotes that by creating this surface cell. I

really believe that, after having looked at it, we have to maintain the three components.

Dr. Smith: MTMC [Military Traffic Management Command] was redesignated the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command in early 2004. Has this been a name change only, or have you seen fundamental changes in that command's mission and the way it does its business?

Gen Hughey: It just better reflects their mission. I mean, Military Traffic Management Command? That was their old name. Is that what they did, manage traffic? I don't think so. Surface Deployment and Distribution Command more clearly defines their mission, both for the Army and for TRANSCOM.

Sealift and Airlift Issues

Dr. Smith: Tell me about your involvement in sealift issues. You've been a member of the Sealift Committee at NDTA⁴³ [National Defense Transportation Association] and of the Executive Working Group [EWG] with the VISA⁴⁴ [Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement] program. Tell me a little bit about what you've done there.

Gen Hughey: TRANSCOM, through the EWG, has been able to take a leadership role in bringing our components, the unions, and the maritime industry together to operate as a team. The Executive Working Group is a very active

⁴³ NDTA is a non-profit, non-political, educational association committed to fostering partnerships between government, military, and industry and maintaining a strong and efficient global transportation, travel, and distribution system in support of national security.

⁴⁴ The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), developed through a partnership between DOD, Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, and US flag commercial sealift industry, establishes the order in which government-owned merchant ships and private sector maritime assets are called up in a war or national emergency. As of 2004, approximately 100 ships were enrolled in the program, 47 of which received a government subsidy under the Maritime Security Program (MSP). The VISA Executive Working Group is a NDTA Military Sealift Committee-sponsored working group consisting of members from DOD, Maritime Administration, US flag commercial carriers, and representatives from the US maritime labor unions to ensure government and industry meet the intent of the VISA program.

organization. We're very busy. We've been able to discuss the problems that the maritime industry was having and come up with solutions. I would like to see the same organizational ability to coordinate the efforts and to really clear up the communications, resolve the conflicts, and fix the problems for the air side, railroads, and trucks. Right now they've been run by our components, but I really believe it all ought to come under TRANSCOM. We ought to have all of those organizations. I think we'll move in that direction due to of the success we've had with the EWG and the Military Sealift Committee. There are a lot of great folks in those two groups.

I was a Marine logistician when I came to this job. When it comes to transportation, we Marines have five- and seven-ton trucks that leak a lot of oil. [Laughter] I'd never even commanded a truck platoon, so my experience in transportation was limited, to say the least. The first EWG that I went to, I was, you can understand, a bit intimidated, mostly due to my lack of experience and knowledge with regard to the maritime industry. But there was such an outpouring of warmth from these marvelous Americans who make up the maritime industry and the unions that by the end of the two-day meeting, I knew there was someone in that group who would help me with any problem I encountered as deputy commander of TRANSCOM.

At the time I didn't realize the extent of my challenges at TRANSCOM, nor did I realize the number of friends I really had. Of all the things that I've done at TRANSCOM, working with the maritime industry has been the most enjoyable and most satisfying. I made a lot of friends. These are wonderful people who do a great service, and an industry that is absolutely vital to our continued economic prosperity. It's something that we have to continue to focus on, and work hard with our legislators to make sure that the programs we have instituted are vital and remain robust. We cannot

afford to ever lose sight of the importance of being a strong maritime nation. And you can't do that without a strong commercial backbone.

Dr. Smith: What are some of the things that TRANSCOM has done to help ensure that?

Gen Hughey: Oh, MSP [Maritime Security Program],⁴⁵ VISA, shipbuilding program. We're a very powerful proponent of the maritime industry.

Dr. Smith: One of the things we've done recently is to ensure we look to commercial carriers first for sealift before using our organic assets.

Gen Hughey: That's always been the TRANSCOM policy, but we haven't always executed it that way. A lot of it was simply because the deployment sequence didn't allow us the time to contract with the commercial industry. We've managed to take some risks and change some procedures that now allow us to give the maritime industry the lead time they need to respond to some of our requirements. Some of the things that are happening within the Maritime Security Program make me very confident that more and more of our deployment is going to be conducted by commercial carriers. We always have to watch the balance, because if you cut out the use of our own Ready Reserve Force [RRF],⁴⁶ then you lose merchant mariner jobs. A robust merchant mariner population is critical to having a robust maritime industry. We have to be very careful about what we do. There always has to be a balance maintained between how much traffic we give to commercial ships that already have their mariners, and the amount that we give to the reserve fleet that has to maintain a

⁴⁵ The Maritime Security Program provides financial assistance to offset the increased costs associated with operating a US-flagged vessel. In return, participating carriers commit vessel capacity and their intermodal transportation resources for DOD use in the event of contingencies. MSP provides assured access to sealift/intermodal capacity and a readily available work force of merchant mariners.

⁴⁶ US government-owned fleet of commercially designed deep-draft ships of various configurations and capabilities maintained by the Maritime Administration to respond within four, five, ten, or twenty days to national emergency sealift requirements, particularly the movement of military unit equipment.

mariner base, and which hires more mariners when we activate RRF ships.

Dr. Smith: In recent weeks about 30 percent of our sealift has been handled by commercial charters. Do you think that's the right amount?

Gen Hughey: Thirty percent in terms of charter? Almost all our sustainment goes by liner service, so it's really a heck of a lot more than 30 percent that we ship commercial.

Dr. Smith: I was thinking in terms of charter versus our reserve fleet.

Gen Hughey: Then 30 percent is about right. And right now, that's about all that the maritime industry can afford to provide us. That is good in terms of maxing them out; everyone is making money. That allows the maritime industry to recapitalize their fleets. These are good times right now for the maritime industry. But the good times were long in coming.

Dr. Smith: You mentioned the committees that you served on at NDTA and that they helped you solve challenges at TRANSCOM. Can you cite some specific examples where that happened?

Gen Hughey: Haiti was a good example. We shipped everything to Haiti commercially. The commercial industry stepped up and was able to provide that service. We worked with them to provide some of the protection they needed, such as biological and chemical protective measures, to service some of the ports that we needed them to serve. Whenever there's a problem, the marvelous civilians and officers we have down in our sealift surface cell here in TRANSCOM work out a lot of the issues. Trying to open up the port of Al Zubayr in Iraq, for instance. If it weren't for Maersk⁴⁷ and their ability to go in there and spend capital to get that port up and operating, we wouldn't be using it. We don't have that capability. Those are the kinds of things I'm talking about--being able to pick up the phone and talk

⁴⁷ The Maersk Line, Limited opened a gateway to Iraq at the port of Al Zubayr located five miles north of the Umm Qasr terminal on the Khor Al Zubayr waterway in March 2004.

to someone who really knows what the hell they're talking about and knows how to do things. We do that every day.

Dr. Smith: During the OIF deployment phase in 2003, we activated CRAF. We didn't activate VISA. What went into the decision not to activate VISA?

Gen Hughey: VISA is designed never to be activated. We don't ever want to have to activate VISA. We want them to come as volunteers. If we were to activate VISA, we could, in fact, destroy an American carrier's competitive edge for a particular liner service. When we do that, a non-American flag carrier steps in and takes over, and the American flag carrier loses the business. When we're done with them, what do they go back to? They don't have anything to go back to, and eventually we don't have a US-flagged commercial fleet. The idea of VISA is, through the Executive Working Group, to be able to get enough volunteers to be able to look at the whole industry and say, "Okay, I need three ships," and get some from each, everyone making a contribution that keeps them viable in the commercial sector. It keeps them competitive, but at the same time gives us what we want. We don't ever want to take over ships, just like we'd prefer not to ever have to take over aircraft. If the carrier industries see it as an advantage to give us what we need and manage it themselves, that's really the best way to go. They know that business better than we do.

Dr. Smith: That happened with CRAF Stage I.⁴⁸ We had as many volunteers as CRAF Stage I provided anyway, so the activation really had no adverse impact.

Gen Hughey: During the initial deployment for Operation Iraqi Freedom, we didn't need to activate the CRAF cargo carriers because of the high number of volunteers. We did eventually have to activate part of the passenger

⁴⁸ CRAF consists of aeromedical, national and international segments of passenger and cargo aircraft, each divided into three increasingly larger "stages" designed to meet requirements from contingencies to major theater wars.

segment for a few months. But we were very concerned about not doing that again during the rotations. And we managed not to have to do it.

Dr. Smith: Because of planning ahead and giving them a chance to volunteer?

Gen Hughey: Planning ahead and letting them know in advance what we need. The threat of activating VISA or CRAF is enough to bring them to the table, to work very hard at giving us what we need, when we need it. The commercial carriers are willing to do that. But there is very little excess out there in the civilian airline business simply because they can't afford it anymore. The competition is so tight. If we take them off their routes, where they would lose competitive advantage, someone else is going to step in right away and fill the vacuum, and it's going to be a non-US flag carrier. If that happens, their competitive edge is gone, and eventually you won't have a Civil Reserve Air Fleet, because you won't have American flag carriers. TRANSCOM worked very hard to make sure that didn't happen, especially with all the problems the airline industry was having with the number of bankruptcies. If we had activated CRAF during the second deployment, we would have pushed a few major carriers into Chapter 10 [bankruptcy], and we certainly didn't want to do that.

Strategic Planning

Dr. Smith: Your predecessor spent a good deal of time developing a strategic plan and metrics that were called strategic issues, which were reviewed every 120 days. The last 120-day strategic issues review took place on 6 November 2002. Has this process been abandoned?

Gen Hughey: Yes. About the time we really started engaging in the distribution process owner mission, General Handy didn't feel the strategic plan as we had been doing it in the past was fruitful. It was a tremendous time drain on everyone, and we were up to our rear ends in alligators at the time with the war. It just wasn't bearing much fruit, whereas the distribution process

was something that we needed to take a hard look at. So that's where we spent our effort.

Dr. Smith: What did the strategic planning offsite in May 2003 accomplish?⁴⁹

Gen Hughey: The strategic planning offsite was really our embarkation upon distribution process ownership. That's what happened. We got off of the old strategic plan and said, "Let's sit down and figure out where we are going, and what TRANSCOM should become." And that's when we invited Newt Gingrich⁵⁰ here, and we had a council. Newt Gingrich has an eighty-pound brain and is just a wonderful guy to have around. He stimulates a lot of thinking. He crafted our vision statement in which he included our distribution responsibilities.⁵¹ We might have done some fine tuning with it, but it wasn't much. And we've been off and running on that ever since.

⁴⁹ From 6-7 May 2003 General Handy held a TRANSCOM visioning conference to discuss transforming DOD distribution and logistics. Participants included the TRANSCOM senior leadership; transportation component command commanders; retired general officers and DOD civilians with logistics backgrounds; a RAND Corporation senior researcher; a member of the SECDEF's Senior Executive Council; and retired Republican Congressman and former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich.

⁵⁰ The former Republican Congressman and Speaker of the House.

⁵¹ The vision statement was "USTRANSCOM provides the synchronized transportation, distribution, and sustainment which makes possible projecting and maintaining national power where needed with the greatest speed and agility, the highest efficiency, and the most reliable level of trust and accuracy." The vision statement changed in early 2006.

Conclusion

Challenges

Dr. Smith: What were your most difficult challenges while serving as our deputy commander?

Gen Hughey: When I first came on board it was trying to find a way to respond to the RFF/DEPORD mode of operation that the Secretary of Defense had embarked upon. At that time I was really pretty much in over my head. Working out the procedures with CENTCOM and Joint Forces Command was a big challenge. The other challenge that consumed a lot of my time has been the joint theater logistics command and trying to resolve the concerns of the Services with regard to that. That's been a very slow and very challenging process.

Accomplishments

Dr. Smith: What do you consider to be your biggest successes, things where you may have had the most impact during your time here?

Gen Hughey: We've been so busy with the alligators fighting the war that I have to think about this question. [Laughter] I'd say getting the Services, with the help of Joint Forces Command, to understand the planning requirements of the rotations and the necessity to spread them out was one of my greater successes in executing the war on terrorism. Getting people to understand that you have to spread out the deployment or redeployment or rotation, but not so much that you had only one-way trips. Now we do a rotation, and it's hardly noticed by anyone.

Another success has been working with the maritime industry and keeping a team spirit among all the players. And bringing the DPO along as far as it's come, being involved in that. Certainly General Handy had more to

do with that than any of us. Bob Dail⁵² [Army Major General Robert T., Director of Operations, USTRANSCOM, August 2003 to November 2004] has done a marvelous job. Chris Ames [Navy Rear Admiral Christopher C., TCJ5, April 2002 to April 2004] and Marc Purcell [Navy Rear Admiral Marc L., TCJ5, April 2004 to July 2006] were exceptional as the J5. Working with the staff on DPO has been something we all can take credit for and be real proud of.

Dr. Smith: What are you most proud of with regard to what the command has accomplished during your tenure?

Gen Hughey: I think we can be most proud that we did our job. We did what everyone expected of us, but at the same time we did so much more. I mean, we were comfortable with our mission, so comfortable that we pushed the envelope while we were fighting a war. People still marvel at that. When I'm out there visiting, people will say, "I don't know how you do it at TRANSCOM. I just don't know how you've done it." Things like the single ticket program⁵³ and making the rotation of forces for Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom run smoothly has really dumbfounded people who aren't here. To do that with the size of the staff that we have compared to other combatant commands says a heck of a lot about TRANSCOM. That was our job going in. But to do that to the amazement of everyone and then, in addition to that, to improve distribution for no other reason than to benefit the warfighters, the combatant commanders, is something that we all can be very proud of. It astounds people that we would reach outside our mission and take on more, when people couldn't understand how we were accomplishing our

⁵² General Dail was promoted to lieutenant general with date of rank of 1 January 2005 and succeeded General Hughey as deputy commander of USTRANSCOM in November 2004.

⁵³ The single ticket program was a USTRANSCOM initiative to schedule the unit movement of passengers from point of departure all the way to final destination before the start of travel rather than booking them by segments as they were traveling. This reduced waiting time at en route stops.

mission to begin with. [Laughter] That says a heck of a lot about this organization and the leadership.

Dr. Smith: Is there anything that you would have done differently or wished the command had done differently?

Gen Hughey: I wish some things hadn't happened. I wish we hadn't had a big row with [USD] AT&L over DLA and TRANSCOM. That consumed a lot of energy and went nowhere. But that wasn't all our doing. We didn't have control over most of that. It required a lot of energy to heal the wounds and get on with the partnership that we ended up with. I'm just thankful that we had people like Keith Lippert and his folks, Dan Mongeon [Army Major General Daniel G., Director of Logistics Operations, DLA, October 2003 to October 2005] and many of the others at DLA who rallied and realized we needed to come together to the benefit of the warfighter, and we did. I wish it hadn't happened, but was it TRANSCOM's fault? No, not entirely. That was really driven by other powers.

Concerns for the Future

Dr. Smith: What worries you most about the command with regard to the future? Are there any clouds out there on the horizon?

Gen Hughey: Yes. Making sure we get enough C-17s is a concern. And I'm not sure how this tanker thing⁵⁴ is going to be resolved. Those are areas that we have to be very concerned about and continue to drive. At the same time, we can't have everything we want, because the nation can't afford it. The important things are getting better utilization from our commercial partners while at the same time spending the money we do have very

⁵⁴ In 2003 DOD approved an Air Force proposal to lease 100 Boeing 767 tankers for \$23 billion, but congressional concern over the cost of the lease and a scandal involving the second most senior Air Force procurement official, Darlene Druyun, who inflated the costs of the lease and steered the contract toward Boeing in return for an executive position with the company after she retired from government service, killed it. In the wake of the scandal, DOD undertook further study of the tanker replacement requirement, the results of which were still pending at the time of this interview.

wisely, and being very judicious about what programs that we drive. It's going to be crucial that we get the Mobility Capabilities Study⁵⁵ right, because that's going to be the basis for the decisions regarding resources in the future.

Dr. Smith: What excites you the most about the future of the command?

Gen Hughey: The DPO and the lead that we've taken in joint theater logistics. If we can solve that problem, it's a legacy we can all be proud of, that we had a part in that. I believe we have the talent here to do that. We will prevail. And that's exciting. Just how long is it going to take? I tell you, when you get down there in the Beltway, there are a lot of obstacles that you have to overcome. Sometimes you just can't see them until you stumble over them. [Laughter]

Dr. Smith: We are entering a period of transition with your retirement and General Handy leaving in 2005.

Gen Hughey: The next leader of TRANSCOM is going to be extremely important, whether or not he's dual-hatted with AMC and TRANSCOM.

Memorable People

Dr. Smith: Who are the people you are going to remember most from this assignment?

Gen Hughey: There have been just so many contributors to making TRANSCOM a success over the last two or three years. General Handy, first all, who gave me this job and is retiring, is unforgettable. Dan McMillin [Daniel F., Senior Executive Service (SES), Deputy Director, TCJ5, August 1997 to August 2003] was the deputy down in the J5, and he got me started.

⁵⁵ DOD initiated the Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) in June 2004. Completed on 29 December 2005, the study was designed to determine whether the programmed transportation force structure would meet strategy requirements for 2012.

Butch Pair, our chief of staff, has been such a marvelous partner and team player. Bill Welser did a magnificent job. Bobby Dail, who has been the J3 and who is going to take my job, will do marvelous things for this command. Bil Johnson⁵⁶ [Army Brigadier General William "Bil" H., Individual Mobilization Assistant and Deputy Director for Operations and Logistics, August 2001 to June 2004], who was his deputy and a reservist, came on active duty as the deputy J3 and is now on active duty now in Iraq. Never going to forget him. Trish Young [Patricia M., SES, Deputy Director for Strategies and Policy, TCJ5, December 2002 to January 2005]; Marge Leclaire [Margaret, SES, Deputy Director for Plans and Programs, TCJ5, July 2003 to the present]; Chris Ames, who has a marvelous future in the Navy. Mark Purcell has amazed me in how fast he's picked up and is accomplishing all that he has. My office staff--Nan Honey [Navy Captain Nancy, executive officer to the deputy commander, USTRANSCOM] and Ardelle Restoff, my secretary--have been with me the whole time. My three aides, G. I. Tuck [Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Giovanni I.], Mike Hafer [Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Michael W.], and now Todd Robbins [Army Lieutenant Colonel Todd C.]. Great Americans. I don't want to put a bunch of names in the history, because then I'm going to forget people. It's not like I've seen the last of these folks, either. I'm not going anywhere, in that I'm not moving far. Seven miles up the road.

Dr. Smith: I understand.

Gen Hughey: They are great Americans, who make this thing work day in and day out, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. You became very aware of the people down there at midnight in the J3, in the command center, working their tails off. You don't remember their names, and sometimes you don't remember their faces, but certainly the job they did you'll remember. I have to tell you, to end up here at the end

⁵⁶ MG Johnson replaced MG Pair as the USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff in November 2005.

of my career, there's just nothing better than this. This is the apex of logistics in the Department of Defense. I've been a logistician my whole career. Other than General Handy's job, this is a job I wanted more than anything else. I'm very content with what we've accomplished, and it's a great place to end my career.

Dr. Smith: That answered my next question, which was give me a heartfelt assessment of this assignment.

Gen Hughey: Yes, well, you got it. [Laughter]

Dr. Smith: Speaking of General Dail, do you have any advice for him as he comes into the job as deputy commander?

Gen Hughey: No. Bob just needs to continue being Bob Dail, and he'll do that. He brings a wealth of expertise and a marvelous reputation among all the Services. He's going to be able to accomplish great things.

Dr. Smith: There's nothing that you think he needs to know as a deputy commander that you might be able to pass on to him, a lesson learned?

Gen Hughey: The sealift guys are great guys. That's the only thing that he's probably not as familiar with as I am at this point, working with EWG and all the things that they can accomplish.

Future Plans

Dr. Smith: You mentioned you aren't moving very far away. What are your plans for the future?

Gen Hughey: We bought some property over near Troy, Illinois, between here and Troy. We're looking forward to building a house out there and going to work in the St. Louis metropolitan area somewhere. Other than that I don't have anything I can talk about. [Laughter]

Importance of Families

Dr. Smith: Is there anything that we didn't get around to discussing, any questions you wished I had asked, or anything else that you'd like to add?

Gen Hughey: One of the things that we didn't talk about was the families. There was tremendous amount of sacrifice made. We brought in a lot of reservists who were separated from their families. That's a contribution. There are a lot families right around here who didn't see their husbands or wives for extended periods of time. Partly it was because they were working shifts, or because they were traveling a lot. And partly it was because we deployed many people to Kuwait and Iraq. I want to reach out and tell the families how much of a difference they've made, and how much their sacrifices have meant to this command and this nation.

Certainly my wife and best friend Heidi is deserving of more thanks than my words will every adequately express. She has shared my concerns for families and throughout my career has ensured that they have not been forgotten or their needs ignored. She has been a strong family advocate and instrumental in all that the "Hughey Team" has accomplished for our Service families. Whether we were working to obtain WIC [Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) Program]⁵⁷ benefits for our families overseas or representing Service family interests to DACOWITS [Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services],⁵⁸ her efforts have been tireless and consistently successful. And, her personal support of me has been unwavering. I can't imagine what I would have done

⁵⁷ WIC is a federally funded program that provides healthy supplemental foods and nutrition counseling for low income pregnant women, new mothers, infants, and children under age five.

⁵⁸ Established in 1951 by then Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, DACOWITS is composed of civilian women and men who are appointed by the Secretary of Defense to provide advice and recommendations on matters and policies relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women in the Armed Forces. In addition, beginning in 2002, the Committee provides advice and recommendation on family issues related to recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military.

without her. My tour at TRANSCOM would certainly not have been as much fun!

Dr. Smith: Thank you, sir.

Biography

Lieutenant General Gary H. Hughey was deputy commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. He retired effective 31 December 2004.

The general was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1970, and attended Basic School in Quantico, Virginia, where he was designated a supply officer. He has held several positions as commander and in joint assignments. Prior to his assignment at USTRANSCOM, the general was deputy commander, Headquarters US Forces, Japan.

EDUCATION:

- 1968 Marine Corps Platoon Leaders Class
- 1970 Bachelor of science in accounting, California State University, Chico, California
- 1977 MBA in management, Bryant College, Smithfield, Rhode Island
- 1978 Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, Virginia
- 1988 College of Naval Warfare, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. October 1970-February 1972, supply officer, Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina.
2. March 1972-March 1974, supply officer, Supply Battalion, 3d Force Service Regiment, Okinawa, Japan.
3. April 1974-August 1977, logistics officer, Marine Barracks, Newport, Rhode Island.
4. September 1977-July 1978, student, Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, Virginia.
5. August 1978-July 1979, supply officer, Headquarters Company, III Marine Amphibious Force, Okinawa, Japan.
6. August 1979-July 1982, logistics systems analyst, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC.
7. August 1982-July 1984, company commander, 1st Landing Support Battalion, Camp Pendleton, California.
8. July 1984-August 1986, executive officer, then commanding officer, Marine Amphibious Unit, Service Support Group 11, Camp Pendleton, California.
9. August 1986-June 1987, head, Semi-Perishable Subsistent Branch, Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
10. July 1987-May 1988, student, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
11. June 1988-August 1991, Head, Material Division, Marine Corps Logistic Base, Albany, Georgia.
12. August 1991-December 1992, assistant chief of staff, G-4, 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Kaneohe, Hawaii.
13. December 1992-July 1994, commander, Brigade Service Support Group-1, Kaneohe, Hawaii.
14. July 1994-May 1995, assistant chief of staff, G-4, Headquarters Marine Forces Pacific, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii.

15. May 1995-July 1997, director, Logistics Plans and Operations, Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Region, Naples, Italy.
16. August 1997-August 1998, commanding general, 3d Force Service Support Group, Camp Kinser, Okinawa, Japan.
17. August 1998-July 2000, commanding general, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, Okinawa, Japan; deputy commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and deputy commander, Marine Forces, Japan.
18. July 2000-August 2002, deputy commander, Headquarters US Forces, Japan.
19. August 2002-November 2004, deputy commander, United States Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal with star
 Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit
 Defense Meritorious Service Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal with star
 Navy Commendation Medal
 Navy Achievement Medal with star
 Combat Action Ribbon

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant	1 January 1970
First Lieutenant	1 April 1971
Captain	1 December 1974
Major	1 July 1980
Lieutenant Colonel	1 September 1986
Colonel	1 April 1992
Brigadier General	20 May 1997
Major General	1 September 2001
Lieutenant General	1 November 2002

Glossary

AFB	Air Force Base
AFMC	Air Force Materiel Command
AMC	Air Mobility Command (Air Force)
	Army Materiel Command
AOR	area of responsibility
CDDOC	CENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center
CFACC	combined force air component commander
CFLCC	combined force land component commander
CINC	commander in chief
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
COCOM	combatant command
CONUS	continental United States
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CTMC	Combined Transportation Movement Center
DACOWITS	Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
DC	District of Columbia
DDOC	Deployment Distribution Operations Center
DEPOD	deployment order
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODAAC	Department of Defense activity address code
DPO	distribution process owner
DTTF	Distribution Transformation Task Force
DWG	Distribution Working Group
EWG	Executive Working Group
EXORD	execution order
FSSG	Force Service Support Group (US Marine Corps)
I&L	Installations and Logistics Directorate (US Marine Corps)
IPT	integrated process team
IT	information technology
ITV	in-transit visibility
JDPO	Joint Deployment Process Owner
JLB	Joint Logistics Board
JLG	Joint Logistics Group
JS-J4	Director of Logistics, Joint Staff
JTL	joint theater logistics
KDDOC	Korean Deployment Distribution Operations Center

MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force (US Marine Corps)
MCS	Mobility Capabilities Study
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSP	Maritime Security Program
N4	Fleet Readiness and Logistics Directorate (Navy)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PDDOC	PACOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center
PWR	provisional war reserve
RFF	request for forces
ROK	Republic of Korea
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
RSO&I	reception, staging, onward movement and integration
SDDC	Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SES	senior executive service
TALCE	tanker airlift control element
TAV	total asset visibility
TCJ3	Operations Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ5	Plans and Programs Directorate, USTRANSCOM (pre-2003)
	Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USD AT&L	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
VTC	video teleconference
WIC	Women, Infants, and Children [Program]

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